I. INTRODUCTION
Credit scoring is like online dating: both use algorithms to sort preferences. lana and Zoe are looking for beaus and they have preferences. Both want a mate who makes six figures and who has good looks. lana prefers a gregarious, but serious intellectual; while, Zoe wants a fellow with a quick, wicked wit. lana and Zoe might be attracted to different characteristics, but in the end they may desire or reject the same men.
Credit scoring is the same. Banks and lenders are looking for potential customers. They want borrowers who will pay on time and who have a solid history of repayment. Like lana and Zoe, different lenders prefer different types of borrowers, so a rejection by one may not mean a rejection by all. While some borrowers are unattractive to almost all lenders (i.e., extremely risky borrowers are uniformly rejected), some lenders may prefer those with poor credit histories or those that live in certain neighborhoods because they can charge those borrowers more.) However, often when this happens, borrowers are unaware of why the lender is offering a certain loan product. Borrowers are essentially told, "This is the right product for your credit needs given your credit score." But, what if the lender's algorithm is designed for price discrimination based on race or one of its proxies?
Minorities' lack of access to credit has transformed into a lack of access to quality credit.
2 With respect to economic achievement, minorities have made.
) An empirical study of loans originated by brokers found that those loans cost borrowers close to twenty basis points more, on average, than retail loans. The study also concluded that minority borrowers with lower incomes and lower credit scores were adversely affected the most. 2 A scurrilous myth regarding the subprime lending and foreclosure crisis is that governmental law and policy through the Community Reinvestment Act ("CRA") forced banks to make loans to minority borrowers that were not creditworthy. See generally Lei Ding et aI., Risky Borrowers or Risky Mortgages Disaggregating Effects Using Propensity Score Models, 331. OF REAL EsTATE RESEARCH 245 (2011) . This report studied comparable borrowers gests that lending disparities are key in determining how individuals accumulate housing equity.s While the market for mortgage lending appears to be highly competitive, asymmetrical information about prices causes a wide disparity among the prices consumers actually pay.6 Lenders use various methods to determine risk-based pricing in the mortgage lending market, and as a consequence minority borrowers have been charged higher interest rates, regardless of their creditworthiness. 7 The lack of uniformity in credit scoring models allows each lender to detine the riskiness of every borrower based on the lender's preference. When the LENDER'S "PERFECT BORROWER" WISH LIST HAPPENS TO BE
MINORITY BORROWERS OR THOSE LIVING IN MINORITY COMMUNITIES, THE DIS-
CRIMINATION IS NOT overt. The discrimination is also less easy to identify as in the past, but is still pervasive. s This type of "second-generation discrimination"-or preferably a maturing disparity-is structural. It is comprised of lending discrimination in both product offerings and borrower selection, and is arguably more complex than the 1960s fair lending laws envisioned.
9 The first- generation's lending disparity involved credit rationing that denied credit to applicants, whereas the second-generation disparity involves risk-based pricing, offering credit to most minority borrowers at prices that are higher than the justifiable risks posed by the loans. This Article does not argue that the fair lending laws are anachronistic per se, but does toy with the notion that the lack of specificity in the statutory language has led to a failure of courts to distinguish fair lending practices properly. Research suggests that regulatory systems intended to decrease lending disparities among minorities, may instead perpetuate discriminatory practices. lo Essentially, lenders can devise loan products that comply with the existing fair lending regulations, but that result in highercost loans to minority borrowers." Specifically, a maturing disparity in fair lending addresses conduct that is accepted industry practice, but when examined critically, shows exclusionary patterns.
The current conventional wisdom believes that competition will eliminate any inherent prejudice. 12 However, regulatory policies intended to detect discrimination in mortgage lending are structurally biased and contribute to inequality by allowing lenders to justify higher, unjustified, and discriminatory prices as legitimate business needs.
13 Whether the borrower's risk actually correlates with the interest rates and fees charged cannot be substantiated.
14 In fact, many lenders' objectives have changed from minimizing the probability of borrower default to maximizing the profits from fees and interest rates. 15 While this switch in objectives may prove beneficial for lenders, problems will arise for borrowers if lenders design credit scoring models using profitability variables based on proxies for prohibited factors, such as race, which do not account for borrowers' actual records of repayment when assessing creditworthiness. 16 Indeed, as the present foreclosure crisis demonstrates, problems arise for society as a whole when lenders create mortgage obligations based on tlawed presumptions of accelerating equity requiring sequential refinancing, rather than on the ability to repay mortgages. I7Data shows that while borrowers with subprime loans are eight times more likely to default than those with prime conventional loans, more than forty percent of those receiving subprime loans qualified for, but were not offered, prime loans. 18 The regulatory challenge thus faced is how to create competitive pressures in the mortgage markets that will increase efficiency and ensure that prices for mortgage credit are commensurate with risk. REV. 799 (1985) . 17 The former Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, Alan Greenspan, conceded that his premise for not regulating the subprime market was based on a "flawed confidence of market self-regulation based on rationality theory." The Financial Crisis and the Role of Federal Regulators: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, are eight times more likely to default than those with prime conventional loans, yet it has been estimated that between thirty and fifty percent of those recei ving subprime loans would, in fact, qualify for prime loans). 19 The call is for a more synergistic integration of economic policy and legal rules. At the request of Financial Services Committee Chairman Barney Frank (D-MA), the Government Accountability Office ("GAO") conducted a "comprehensive review" of the current state of federal fair-lending enforcement. The report, released in July 2009, found that data enhancement is needed to detect potential fair lending violations. It also suggested that an overhaul of the financial regulatory structure is best to ensure "consistent and effective federal oversight" of fair lending laws. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FAIR LENDING: DATA to discourage lending decisions that produce racial disparity. It argues that there are two unresolved structural issues: (I) determining the economic variables used in the disparate impact regressions, and (2) narrowing the definition of "legitimate business need" to exclude supra-competitive profits. Part II of this Article defines second-generation lending discrimination claims and distinguishes them from first-generation claims. Part II also argues that some of the difficulty in addressing second-generation claims is in the failure of the regulatory system to properly address lenders' actions in targeting communities, offering products, and categorizing loans as discriminatory. This section ends with a review of Title VII's effects test and its application in the fair lending context.
Part III discusses the economics of mortgage lending. First, Part III provides background information on credit scoring and underwriting as risk predictors, explaining how statistical testing can incorporate prohibited demographic variables, such as the race and ethnicity of the borrower or the neighborhood, into models and result in a disparate impact. Part III also examines the correlation between statistical discrimination and continuing credit market disparities. Part III concludes that informational asymmetries in the mortgage credit market combined with minority borrower search costs create a market that, though not fully competitive, relies upon and evaluates lender conduct based on competitive market assumptions.
Part IV raises the issue of whether there is racial discrimination in the economic predictors used in mortgage lending credit scoring. It argues that credit scoring if unchecked is an intrinsic, established form of discrimination very similar to redlining. Part IV argues that restoring the proper balance of competitive pressures in the residential mortgage market-both in the origination and refinance markets-begins with reducing informational asymmetries. It posits that the failure of competitive forces to disallow unjustified, and often illegal, interest rate charges also speaks to regulatory failure. Specifically, Part IV also argues for changes to regulatory oversight and testing for disparate impact discrimination.
Using Title VII's validation of selection requirements as a guide, this Article recommends that the regulatory evaluation of credit scoring models consider the actual performance of similar borrowers to detect whether the criteria used are different when minority borrowers are involved or when property is located in minority communities. This evaluation would be similar to the validation requirement in the employment context where there is an actual measure of a practice as job-related. Lenders operating in noncompetitive subprime mortgage markets should also be required to address how their practices affect lending disparities. In addition, the proposed approach would require regression analysis to take into account, and control for, all measurable variables that might explain the disparities found. 2 oAn evaluation of the effects of omitted factors in fair lending models often results in an inaccurate statistical racial estimate of discrimination. A broader fair lending analysis would include racecontrolled variables, but would carefully exclude non-race variables to determine whether disparate lending exists. Such an analysis would not only show the true risk-based price correlation to interest rate charges, but would also eliminate the argument that the possibility of default by subprime borrowers justifies a higher interest rate? 1 The result would be greater transparency for all borrowers and a clearer identification of when a legitimate business need exists and justifies lenders charging higher interest rates based on the probability of default. Addressing structural bias at the regulatory level would bring to light which customs, practices, and policies perpetuate racial discrimination.
II. ASSESSING DISCRIMINATION: A THEORETICAL OVERVIEW

A. Maturing Disparities: Second-Generation Fair Lending Claims
Fair lending laws address discrimination based on disparate treatment or outright bias?2 When Congress passed Title VIII of the Equal Opportunity Act, lenders "red-lined" minority neighborhoods and denied borrowers loans based on the property 10cation.23 Current anti-discrimination laws still favor intentional conduct as the basis of a c1aim?4 Unfortunately, anti-discrimination laws provide less protection when the injury involves subconscious and less obvious, but equally harmful, forms of discrimination. and subordination requires a re-evaluation of whether discrimination in lending is best addressed through traditional civil rights law. 25 Subprime lending was incontrovertibly steered toward minority communities?6 The real question is how this happened. One explanation may be based on the way that lenders use credit scoring to ration credit. Lenders do not ration credit exclusively by price, which is why even loan approvals present an issue of discriminationY Indeed, the mortgage credit market has shifted from the credit rationing practice of red-lining to a credit access policy of risk-based pricing. 28 practices that result in a disparate impact is the question.
To ration loans exclusively by price does not create a discrimination problem?9However, just as asymmetric information supports credit rationing, it can support risk-based pricing.
3D The adverse consequence is that lenders unfavorably determine prices for some borrowers and those borrowers who are either imprudent or unknowing borrowers will accept the higher interest rates.
31
Thus, informational asymmetries capture uninformed borrowers, who ultimately pay higher search costs as a result of their ignorance. If lenders used riskbased pricing across the board for all loans, then interest rates alone would ration credit. 32 Instead, lenders allocate credit using information-based discriminationY Using "parsimonious" credit scoring models, or those with a limited number of explanatory variables, lenders can hide intentionally chosen discriminatory variables.
34
It is also difficult to discern whether the scoring systems are accurate, specifically, whether they over, or possibly, under-predict minority borrower performance. 35 The legal and regulatory question ought to be whether the particular scoring model provides a valid basis for differential group expectations. 36 It appears indisputable that lenders may choose risk assessment methods that in- 29 (1996) (concluding that the evidence of statistical discrimination based on aggregate loan data is inconclusive). 34 Restsinas & Belsky, supra note 30, at 139 n.1O ("As the number of explanatory variables increases, the lender runs the risk of unintentionally establishing a record of statistical discrimination, if the added variables are correlated with race. More variables add explanatory power to the model, and the costs of estimation and data storage are trivial compared with the benefits of lowering default rates."). stitutionalize discrimination. 37 This casts doubt on the adequacy of the assessments and models lenders use to predict performance. Additionally, it is quite possible that the instruments used to assess minority creditworthiness might need to be adjusted for general lower income level minority candidates. 38 Without such adjustments, it may be that traditional credit predictors are not adequate indicators of loan performance for minority borrowers.
The appropriate approach for second-generation lending issues is a prospective method that cuts-off the unintentional or sub-conscious bias in decisionmaking prior to the actual decision-making. First-generation discrimination claims in employment and lending tend to focus on animus. 39 Courts have primarily interpreted the causation factor as the irrational stereotype or harm to the individual, with little or no focus on the organizational environment and the effects of decision-making. 40 Instead, in the lending context, the source of funding is a starting point of inquiry.41 By identifying the structure under which lenders make their decisions, regulators can more fully assess whether implicit bias influences the decision-making. Moving the focus to the way in which lenders make decisions instead of discrete instances of racial animus allows more scrutiny on whether the bias actually exists. Similarly, in the context of lending, the policies that dictate the decision-making result in discriminatory lending that appears neutral and objective, but in fact have a disparate impact.
Critical to the enforcement of fair lending laws are the regulatory measures designed to halt discriminatory practices. 42 Indeed, reliance on enforcement by regulatory agencies, which adopted a laissez-faire approach, was one of the key failures that led to the subprime lending crisis. 43 Regulatory failure was threefold. First, the de-regulation of mortgage interest rates led to innovation in mortgage lending loans of various types increasing borrowers' debt in general and creating a credit bubble. Second, financial innovation led to investments in the U.S. justify the presence of discrimination, which is described as irrational and inefficient. 44 Some law and economics scholars would argue that American law has progressed sufficiently. Indeed, these scholars argue that civil rights laws, because they are based on racial animus, are no longer needed. 45 In other words, the markets have been freed to operate efficiently.46 To some, an efficient market correlates with a plausible, although legally unjustified explanation of legitimate business need. 47 As will be shown below, the disparate impact framework, as the courts have adopted, has a narrow view of causation and makes it difficult to hold lenders responsible for their discriminatory policies and practices. Instead, the framework allows lenders to more readily fashion a business justification for their resuIts. Disparate impact in fair lending takes its theoretical basis from Title VII of housing market through mortgage-backed securities, creating a housing bubble of rapidly appreciating housing values. Third, policymakers failed to recognize the increasingly important role played by the shadow banking system, which provided substantial credit to the U.S. economy, but was not subject to the same regulations. When an inadequate financial cushion was insufficient to absorb the large loan defaults, the losses impacted the ability of financial institutions to lend, slowing economic activity. ("Rather, other substantive areas of law can and should incorporate expansive equality principles to achieve that end. For example, this Article demonstrates how the implied obligation of good faith in contract law, applied in the at-will employment context, can employ expansive equality principles to provide alternate remedies to at-will employees who may not be able to obtain civil rights remedies because of the onerous burdens they must satisfy in order to prevail on their civil rights claims."). 45 America's history of racial oppression and the unequal treatment of blacks has often resulted in tense relations between blacks and whites. In 2008, when Barack Obama became the first black person elected President of the United States, many citizens, especially nonminority, concluded that the long history of racial tension and inequality was past. Whether America is post-racial depends not only on explicit conscious attitudes, but on the removal of implicit attitudes and subconscious bias as well. The Supreme Court put forth the fundamental structure of employment law disparate impact in Griggs v. Duke Power. 55 In Griggs, black potential employees challenged the employer's 'neutral' traditional job criteria requiring workers to have a high school diploma. 56 The Court reasoned that a more searching inquiry into facially neutral policies and practices was warranted to determine if the employer's hiring standards were a business necessity.57 What made the employer's system discriminatory was not that it was designed to harm black workers intentionally, but that Title VII was specifically designed to make equal employment opportunities available to black workers. 58 The Court found that the employer's requirement of a high school diploma to qualify for the job did not have a manifest relationship to the performance criteria of the job, and was instead discriminatory.59 However, the court also developed the business necessity test as a way for an employer to provide a legitimate reason for a requirement which results in a disparate impact on minorities.
Following Griggs, there were a series of cases in which the Supreme Court continuously cut-back on the disparate impact doctrine. 60 The most controversial was Wards Cove v. Antonio.
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Wards Cove represented a major shift in plaintiffs' rights in disparate impact cases in three respects. Under Wards Cove, the business necessity test favored the employer.62 First, plaintiffs would have to identify the "specific or particular employment practice" that resulted in the disparate impact, rather than merely a generalized disparity in the workplace, as had previously been accepted. Second, rather than having to show that its policy was job-related and consistent with business necessity, the defendant's policy justification would be subject to only a "reasoned review." Finally, the burden of proof would "remain with the plaintiff at all times." Even when the employer asserted its justification for the discriminatory policy, its burden would only be one of production, not of persuasion. While employers had to provide a business basis for the challenged facially neutral policy, the business basis did not have to be essential or indispensible to pass muster. 63 In reaction to Wards Cove, Congress codified Griggs, making disparate impact an unlawful employment practice in the 1991 Civil Rights Act. 64 Disparate impact has been extended to other circumstances involving neutral standards and criteria having an adverse impact. 65 For example, an employer may have an overall selection process that has no disparate impact, but can be found liable under Title VII if an individual part of its practice has a disparate impact. 66 The Court has also held that subjective criteria can be scrutinized because these employment practices could be manipulated for discriminatory purposes. 67 This reasoning requires employers to develop explicit hiring guidelines and selection procedures that are job-related and consistent with business necessity.6s Failure to show that a challenged policy or practice is essential to the skills needed for successful job performance creates employer liability. Employment practices that have been successfully challenged as not having a business justification include written tests,69 subjective evaluations,1° age,71 height and weight requirements,72 and physical tests. 73 A specific policy or practice should be associated with the skills needed to perform the job successfully, in contrast to a general measurement of an applicant's or employee's abilities.
The disparate impact doctrine analysis involves a burden-shifting test requiring validation of empirical and statistical data. 74 To present a prima facie case, a plaintiff must show that a particular employment practice has caused an adverse impact to a protected class. 75 Evidence of the disparity must be sufficiently substantial. 76 The disparity must be shown to exist with respect to a pool of qualified persons, which is usually the applicant pool.77 After showing the existence of the disparity, the burden shifts to the employer to establish the fairness of the predictive test, and that the challenged practice has a business necessity.78 The burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to show a less burden- 74 A prima facie disparate impact case requires the plaintiff to identify a specific policy or practice that creates a statistical disparity for minorities. The employer must then justify the challenged act as a business necessity. The burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to show a less adverse alternative to such a policy or practice. some alternative. 79 The alternative must be proven to be equally efficient and cost-effective. 80 The fair lending disparate impact test is drawn exclusively from Title VII.81 As will be discussed below, fair lending is distinguishable from employment in several respects and requires a different test in order to meet its goals.
42 V.S.c. § 2000e-2(k)(I)(A)(i)(2006).
Fair Lending Disparate Impact Test and Regulation B
The fair lending laws comprise four statutes enacted over a ten-year period. 82 The Equal Credit Opportunity Act ("ECOA,,)83 and the Fair Housing Act ("FHA Act,,)84 specifically prohibit discrimination in lending and thus regulate implicit bias in the marketplace. 85 These statutes are interrelated and, as a body of law, are designed to create fair and equitable access to credit for minorities. 86 Congress enacted the ECOA primarily for the purpose of eliminating discrimination in credit transactions. It is most prominently used in fair lending challenges against private creditors. s7 As a result, enforcement efforts have increased as credit access has become more available to minorities. 88 As in Title ville/Jefferson County Metro Human Relations Comm'n, 508 F.3d 366, 387-90 (6th Cir. 2007) (Moore, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (distinguishing different burdens of proof and production in disparate impact cases). 79 See Graoch, 508 F.3d at 379. 80 The Uniform Guidelines require that each validation study include "an investigation of suitable alternative selection procedures and suitable alternative methods of using the selection procedure which have as little adverse impact as possible, to determine the appropriateness of using or validating them in accord with these guidelines." See 29 c.F.R. VII, fair lending disparate impact is a burden-shifting test, with the initial burden of proof on the plaintiff. 89 After the plaintiff identifies the challenged practice that has a disproportionate adverse effect on a protected class, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that the practice was needed because of a "business necessity."9o
The Federal Reserve Board's ("FRB") Regulation B focuses on the fair treatment of customers in the granting of credit. 91 The regulation requires lenders to grant credit based on the borrower's ability to meet the lender's credit standards and prohibits the lender's consideration of race, age or marital status of the borrower in making that decision. 92 After the Ward's Cove decision, the FRB revised its rules to reject explicitly the Supreme Court's test for disparate impact in that case, and to adopt the burden of proof allocation from the 1991 Civil Rights Act. This change is significant because the legitimate business justification for a post-Wards Cove plaintiff under the case law eased the lender's evidentiary burden. 93 In defending a challenged practice, the lender only needed to produce evidence that its system was validated as predictive. 96 Recent fair lending litigation involving DOJ and its enforcement of the fair lending statutes raises claims of "redlining," in which financial institutions are claimed to deny credit in areas with large minority populations, rather than granting credit in a discriminatory man-discriminatory and what lenders can or should do to avoid discriminatory conduct. However, the distinctions that clarify the proper role of business necessity in lending remain in question. 97 In applying the business necessity test, few courts have discussed the differences between Title VII and Title VIles While principles of efficiency and productivity underlie all business decision-making, what constitutes a business justification depends on the issue. By its nature, employment law and hiring require more of an evaluation of personal characteristics than in the fair lending arena. Under Title VII, typical characteristics related to job performance serve as appropriate limitations and require that the employer make fine line distinctions in establishing the criteria.
By contrast, imposing those types of limitations in an efficient market context is inapposite to the concept of risk-based pricing. While undoubtedly the purpose is to increase business volume while reducing the costs associated with defaults or other financial losses, the prerequisite is that achieving the goal be within a pre-determined business objective. Under Title VIII governing fair lending, the exceptions justifying a legitimate business decision should be narrowly confined to the borrower's ability to repay the obligation. Other personal characteristics unrelated to the borrower's income or earning ability, such as education, occupation, or level of skill within an occupation, should be irrelevant. 99 A law requiring a rigorous analysis to root out these kinds of subjective criteria, which lead to discriminatory lending practices, is both necessary and desirable. 100 ner. The parties have entered into a consent decree after settling the cases; therefore, it is difficult to know the basis of the claims brought by 001 against the financial institutions. 3. The Reverse Redlining Cases "Reverse redlining" refers to the practice of targeting predatory loans at urban, minority communities that in the past were denied the ability to obtain credit. lOl The largely unregulated subprime mortgage market-in both its residential and refinance sectors-targeted lower and moderate income communities, often comprised of minority borrowers who were financially unsophisticated and illiterate. When applying federal antidiscrimination law, several district courts have addressed the reverse redlining issue.
102 Each court struggled with the complexity of the fair lending scheme and specifically, with the issue of causation. 103 (1996) . In the context of lending discrimination, taste discrimination evaluates potential borrowers on characteristics unrelated to loan performance. ld. Market theorists describe this discrimination as inefficient and not profit-maximizing for the firm. An individual lender may have a taste for discrimination. Under market theory, the lender is willing to pay an additional price not to pursue an opportunity, in order to discriminate. In a competitive market, non-discriminating firms are willing to lend to those who are discriminated against at attractive rates. Taste discrimination cannot survive in the face of competition. The lender wishing to discriminate would eventually be eliminated by competitive market forces. Efficient market theorists argue, therefore, that discrimination is inefficient and requires no governmental controls or intervention. 109 Sub-prime loans present financial advantages for lenders because they are priced according to the riskiness that the borrower presents. Minorities accounted for forty-nine percent of the increase in home ownership from 1995 to 2005. See Goldstein supra note 2. African-Americans and Hispanics are disproportionately represented in the subprime mortgage market. Studies conducted by HUD, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and others show that minority borrowers, especially in urban areas, are disproportionately represented in the subprime market. This fact has led some commentators to assert that fair lending rules are responsible for the crisis. However, that assertion without a knowledgeable understanding of the home mortgage market obfuscates the problem. Risk-based or subprime lending is important to the economy from the perspective of lenders and borrowers.
writing as predictive methods of risk assessment, and whether these methods produce informational asymmetries that lead to statistical discrimination.
Lenders use predictive analysis, e.g., methods such as credit scoring and underwriting, to determine a potential borrower's willingness to repay a 10an.IID Lenders also have a perverse incentive to use credit scoring and underwriting to maximize profits. I I I When left unchecked, what many describe as a legitimate response to risk is actually lending discrimination. I 12 I. Credit Scoring Historically, we were not willing to lend because banks did not have access to large supplies of credit. This short supply of credit resulted in lenders rationing credit. I 13 A more abundant supply of credit has allowed lenders to segment the market and identify borrowers who are able to repay loan obligations and willing to pay above-market interest rates or receive subprime 10ans. 850, 854 (1985) (positing that credit is rationed in markets that have ineffective screening and that borrowers with a higher probability of default choose a higher interest rate). weighted value.
116
Today, automated credit decision-making has replaced human judgments. I 17 When used in its optimal configuration, credit scoring models evaluate the credit risk of some sort of homogenous subpopulation.
118 The calculation analyzes multivariate correlations, identifies the relevant trade-offs among factors, and assigns statistically derived weights used in the model.
I19 Primarily, the model is an assessment of the relationship between pre-determined variables.
12o
Using a sample of past credit users, a lender incorporates variables and assigns weights to them based on the probability of past borrowers to make timely, voluntary payments.
121
Borrower creditworthiness involves evaluating factors that review repayment behavior and reveal the borrower's attitudes toward debt.
122 Credit history reveals past and existing mortgage debt, installment and revolving credit, and past credit problems, such as collections, repossessions, foreclosures and bank- 118 Statistical models are often described as a scorecard, a pooled scorecard, and a custom scorecard. A scorecard uses data from one firm. A pooled scorecard uses data from many firms. A custom scorecard blends a statistical model with some of the factors used in a judgmental model. Id.
119 Empirical scoring is a straightforward, very traditional method of credit analysis and sometimes is referred to as data-driven or descriptive credit modeling. Robert ruptcies to produce an overall credit score. 123
A mathematical formula correlates significant industry factors to the past performance of borrowers. 124 The model construct is usually a linear regression analysis of potential predictors based on a determined number of variables. The variables on which the prediction is based are usually selected based on their profit-maximizing predictability.125 The comparison of the "lower-scoring applicants" with the actual scores of well-performing borrowers is made to determine if the applicants can meet the lender's pre-determined level of risk. 126 An empirical model is easy to understand and augment, but unlike the iconic model, its predictive variables do not bear any relationship to the resulting responses. 127 The advantage of credit scoring as a screening device is that the information evaluated supposedly bears no explicit relationship to the borrower's immutable characteristics. 128 Lenders determine both whether a borrower has the ability to repay the loan, as well as whether the payments will be timely by evaluating a borrower's past credit history.129 Lenders weigh this credit history along with information from other sources to assess the lending risks and screen borrowers. When lenders use this type of objective data, the borrower benefits. 130 However, if the predictive variables used in the credit-scoring model are improper, they hide unfair procedures and processes.13I The increase in lending discrimination raises a valid concern not only about the inherent deficiencies in 123 Capron, supra note 12l.
124 Id. 125 The determination of which factors to use, and how each will be scored and weighed, is generally based on the performance of past customers, the products and services sold, and the industry standards. Id.
126 Id. 127 The determination of which factors to use, and how each will be scored and weighted, is generally based the performance of past customers, the products and services sold and the industry standards. An empirical model is easy to understand and augment but unlike the iconic model, its predictive variables do not bear any relationship to the resulting responses. Hand, supra note 117, at 124. 
(\997).
131 For example, a study of credit scoring and loan approval rates in the automobile insurance industry revealed that credit scoring was unfavorable to minorities. See, e.g., CHI CHI Wu, CONSUMERLAW.ORG, CREDIT SCORING AND INSURANCE: COSTING CONSUMERS BIL-credit models, but also about the impact of using those models as screening devices for loan terms and interest rates. 132 As discussed below, the borrower's characterization as subprime may be advantageous to both the lender and the underwriter.
Underwriting
Underwriting is the process of evaluating the risk of extending credit. Whether this is distinct from credit scoring when used in integrated risk assessment systems is open for debate. 133 Nevertheless, the underwriting process has implications for fair lending compliance that have been largely overlooked. 134 Underwriting is a critical component of lending.
135 Underwriting determines the borrower's financial qualifications and assesses if the borrower is a sound Bester, supra note 113, at 854; and, Sonntag, supra note 112, at 55 (positing that credit is rationed in markets that have ineffective screening and that borrowers with a higher probability of default choose a higher interest rate). Section 215 of the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 ("FACT Act") directs the Federal Reserve Board and the Federal Trade Commission ("FIC") to study how credit scoring has affected the availability and affordability of credit and insurance, to determine the relationship between credit scores and actual credit losses and insurance claims, and to determine how these relationships vary for the population groups protected under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act ("ECOA"). In addition, section 215 directs the Board and the FIC to study the extent to which the consideration of certain factors included in credit scoring models could have a negative or differential effect on populations protected under ECOA and the extent to which alternative factors could be used in credit scoring to achieve comparable results with less negative effects on protected populations. Many who have studied the issue of adverse impact view it in terms of lost opportunity costs. See generally BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE Sys.,
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON CREDIT SCORING AND ITS EFFECTS ON THE AVAILABII.ITY AND AFFORDAIlILITY OF CREDIT (2007) [hereinafter FRB REPORT TO CONGRESS ON CREDIT SCOR-ING]. That report concluded that "[t]
here is no compelling evidence, however, that any particular demographic group has experienced markedly greater changes in credit availability or affordability than other groups due to credit scoring." Id. 135 Chandrasekhar, supra note 129, at 186. lending risk. 136 It is a composite evaluation of the borrower's character or credit reputation, the borrower's capacity or ability to repay, and the collateral risk or the loan to value ratio.13? Choosing the underwriting variables is also a subjective decision. 138 The borrower's employment, income, and funds on deposit for the down payment and closing costs must all be verified. 139 A lender's concern about repayment is translated into the loan terms. 140 If the risk is considered normal or reasonable for the type of transaction, the loan is priced with the lender's best interest rate. If the risk is considered above average, the lender will increase the interest rate, may request additional collateral, and also may impose more stringent loan terms. 141 In the recent past, lenders have rejected consumers with the worst credit histories and scores because of the possibility of default. 142
The direct economic function of deterrence relates to the borrower's group risk. Through the underwriting process, the lender is able to reduce the costs of prevention or expected harm. Using mathematical models allows underwriting to be efficient, but may not allocate risk according to individual risk rating. 143 To the extent that individual risk characteristics are not accurately taken into consideration, a borrower may be placed in a particular risk pool based on illegal group characteristics, rather than borrower risk. Lenders, using demographic variables selectively designate borrowers for risk pools based on expected profits. Underwriting, because it evaluates a borrower's risk, has the potential to transform the lending market. First, through pricing policies, underwriting identifies risks based on detailed inquiries of public and private information 136 about borrowers. 145 To the extent that individual risk characteristics are not accurately taken into consideration, a borrower may be placed in a particular risk pool based on illegal group characteristics, rather than borrower risk. 146 Lenders, who use demographic variables selectively, designate borrowers for risk pools based on expected profits. 147 Secondly, underwriting can involve subjective decision-making. Identifying which demographic variables will be used is a judgmental decision. Mortgages now involve third parties who have financial incentives, such as brokers and correspondent lenders. As agents of lenders, these third parties are integral to mortgage origination functions, but also have a conflict of interest. 148 The 145 What is perhaps most significant, is that underwriting does factor variables such as "culture" and "behavior" into pricing decisions. See Susan Block-Lieb, The Myth of the Rational Borrower: Rationality, Behavioralism, and the Misguided "Reform" of Bankruptcy Law, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1481, 1510-15 (2006) (disputing the premise that consumer's economic behavior is based on the consumer's knowledge and understanding of legal rules, and arguing that stronger regulation may be needed to correct the market inefficiency that results when lenders take advantage of consumer's decisional biases and laws protect lenders rather than consumers).
146 Brokers routinely process the application and underwrite the loan to qualify the application for a particular lender. transfer of the underwriting function to third parties is an off-shoot of market segmentation. 149 It is uncertain whether regulatory efforts are stringent enough to assess a lender's monitoring activities of third parties. Lenders have a duty to monitor and have strong control systems in place that ensure the quality of originations, verify compliance with all applicable laws and regulations, and prevent fraud.
150
Finally, the majority of underwriting is automated. 151 Quite possibly, this subtle transfer of decision-making and reliance on technology is contributing to the marginalization of borrowers, as well.
152 The Government Sponsored Enterprises ("GSEs"), Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, have developed automated underwriting systems that evaluate mortgage applications in a very short amount of time. These systems evaluate applications based on information in credit reports, the applicant's income, and the applicant's loan-to-value ratio.153
Lenders can submit a loan application to these automated underwriting systems prior to approving a loan and receive an indication from the GSE that they Market segmentation is an accepted business method and is economically efficient. Market segmentation is a sign of maturation in the market. Customer segmentation leads to more homogeneous markets as businesses identify an untapped need and organize to capture that segment. 153 STUART, supra note 37, at 196 (discussing the involvement of GSEs in the underwriting process).
will purchase the loan. 154 Lenders heavily rely on these systems that predetermine credit availability based on segmented markets, borrower's earning power, and the property's geographical 10cation.155 As discussed below, a lender's characterization of a borrower as subprime may be advantageous to both the lender and the underwriter. 156 The prevalence of automated underwriting systems, such as credit scoring, indicates that those systems are both efficient and unbiased.157 Yet, before relying upon this presumption, it ought to be scrutinized closely. Statistical discrimination explains how inequality may persist among demographic groups when lenders use stereotypes based on a discriminated group's average behavior.
B. Statistical Discrimination
Statistical discrimination is a potent explanation for continuing credit market disparities.
159 Statistical discrimination is discrimination based on stereotypes. Using collected information and empirical data about a groups' behaviors and mores, economists develop a statistical analysis of the group's probable behav-154 A lender can override an automated underwriting decision and underwrite the loan manually; however, if they do so, the lender must agree to buy back the loan if it defaults and violates the purchaser's loan standards. While a loan with an automated underwriting approval that meets all the purchaser's standards and complies with the warranties of sale carries no risk for a lender or broker, a loan that has been approved by overriding automated underwriting standards does carry significant risk. Lenders still manually underwrite many loans, but lenders review a majority of the applications using an automated underwriting system. Each GSE sets guidelines for reviewing applications and for obtaining and using credit histories. See STUART, supra note 37, at 109. ior.16O There is a circular argument that attempts to explain and justify the use of statistical discrimination and its significance. The argument relies on the premise that discrimination is irrational. It justifies statistical discrimination as based on accurate information and therefore rational and a likely probability of a group's preference. If the information is inaccurate, the discrimination is a result of taste, not statistical, discrimination. 161 Whether lenders are willing to or see the need to collect more accurate information is questionable. 162 Both costs and embedded stereotypical notions of the minority borrower profile preclude any lender incentive to do so. 163
Statistical discrimination is considered an efficient response to inadequate information taken from measurable differences in group behavior. l64 The underlying premise of statistical discrimination is that it is cost-effective to discriminate because of the limited information that is available to lenders. 165 Lenders perform credit rationing as a way of selecting the best borrowers. 166 Kenneth Arrow asserts that statistical discrimination is largely the result of the costs of information collection. Using a screening process as the center of the discussion, Arrow argues that measures that predict productivity, in this case borrower qualifications, are costly. 167 Lenders use accepted and prevailing expectations, perceptions and stereotypes because the costs of acquiring informa- tion to challenge prior expectations are expensive. 168 As a result, even qualitied borrowers who are members of the discriminated group are evaluated as not creditworthy and thus subject to either loan denials or higher than necessary interest rates. 169 Lenders are apt to defend this method of adverse selection. Offering buyers different prices based on their credit characteristics is simply risk-based pricing and does not necessarily represent pricing disparity.170 The cost of lending, which includes the possibility of default and loan administration costs, will also give lenders an economic motive for varying lending criteria according to probable risk. 17I To ration loans by price exclusively does not create a discrimination problem.172 However, just as asymmetric information supports credit rationing, it can support risk-based pricing. 173 The unfavorable consequence is that prices are not determined favorably for borrowers, and imprudent or unknowing borrowers will accept the higher interest rates. 174 Moreover, the connection between the deregulation of the banking industry and the increase in lending discrimination cannot be ignored. Deregulation led to significant improvements in efficiency, lowered entry fees, and increased competition. These combined to reduce costs and lower interest rates. As the costs of lending fell, lenders received lower profits; the pressure on profit margins caused banks to improve loan portfolio performance. 175 Consumers benefitted from those cost reductions by receiving lower interest rates. As the costs of lending fell, lenders also received lower protits. 172 Prudent borrowers will be deterred by higher interest rates, while imprudent or dishonest borrowers may be undeterred. This adverse sorting causes expected profits per dollar lent to be concave in interest rates. This leads to a "bank-optimal" interest rate, beyond which the supply of credit is negatively sloped and where banks ration credit. Martin and Smyth provide statistical evidence that mortgage supply functions are backward bending in interest rates and that the "bank-optimal" mortgage interest rate is approximately eleven percent. Martin, supra note 29, at 139 (citing Robert E. Martin & David J. Smyth, supra note 29, at 1072). Nonperforming or delinquent loans declined significantIy.176 Increased competition forced banks to review those parts of the business that generated unprofitable 10ans.177 To show that there is a statistical basis for discrimination, groups of unprofitable loans appeared as geographic clusters based on minority concentrations. 178 Therefore, redlining was a natural consequence of the increase in competition. 179
The use and structure of risk assessment methods deepens the penalties that historically underserved and discriminated borrowers face. To a large extent, lenders are over-relying on credit scores and exacerbating the problem of highcost credit. Higher credit scores result in higher interest rates and ultimately higher costs of loan transactions. What occurs is a cyclical reinforcing response: more expensive financing, leading to late payments or the inability to pay, leading to more depressed scores and higher costs for credit.
The increased roles and responsibilities of mortgage brokers and correspondents, and the financial incentives available to them have altered both lending and underwriting. There is a need to re-structure and use risk assessment predictors in a way that synthesizes the competing dynamics and results in more transparency. Reconciling the informational asymmetry and the risk predictors should not be left to only those lenders who voluntarily decide to acquire better information. Rather, as discussed below in Part IV, such reconciliation should be a legal duty that embraces more responsible lending.
C. Credit Scoring as a Maturing Disparity
Race, as a profit-maximizing strategy, lurks troublingly beneath the subprime mortgage crisis. According to a study published by the National Reinvestment Coalition in 2006, subprime loans comprised a disproportionate share of all loans issued to minorities. During that year, whites received the largest number of subprime loans, more than any other racial group within the U.S. cial differences in mortgage loan documents demonstrate the role that race plays in creating lending bias. 181 Title VII scholars critiquing its efficacy have posited various theories for the statute's flawed presumptions. 182 The theories include implicit bias and stereotyping, and the remedies include "fair measures.,,183 The persistence of racially biased implicit attitudes and stereotypes and the difficulty of changing them have led many scholars to advocate for reform of the legal rules that trigger discriminatory actions. 184 Implicit bias legal theory, at its base, tries to incorporate behavioral realism into legal rules. 18S
Once again the parallels between employment law and lending are not exact. In the fair lending context, implicit bias provides a perspective for understanding a lender's perverse incentives to discriminate. 186 To the extent that a lender's decisions are based on stereotypes and inaccurate comparisons and perceptions of minority borrowers, unconscious bias has seeped into the neutral process of lending. 183 Although Title VII does not recognize the role of unconscious stereotyping, Krieger asserts that implicit biases and intentional discrimination are related. Krieger argues that Title VII has three erroneous assumptions. Id. Specifically, Title VII incorrectly assumes that: (I) conscious discriminatory motive or intent is present; (2) that discrimination is irrational; and, (3) that discriminatory motivation is irrelevant to judgmental strategies. Id. A relatively new theory addressing the problem of racial injustice focuses on unconscious bias or the implicit bias and discriminatory actions of individuals. See Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1493-94 (2005). The theory is based on studies of the cognitive process of the mind and its capacity to make decisions based on inherent racially biased attitudes and stereotypes. Id. These studies have determined that individuals are unaware of their own implicit biases and how those biases affect their decisions. Id. minority borrowers. ISS But, the existence of substantive inequalities, such as those that may be embedded in current credit scoring models, caII for more focused policy reforms that address and eradicate these economic harms. IS9
Subjectivity may be present in "objective" risk predictors and must be rooted out when found. A unanimous Court in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust found that disparate impact requires analyzing "subjective or discretionary employment practices.,,190 Combining the 1991 Civil Rights Act's reversion to pre-Wards Cove case law with the result in Watson, the disparate impact doctrine can be used to scrutinize hidden intentional discrimination and "subconscious stereotypes and prejudices."191 This scrutiny is the basis for the recommended changes to the fair lending rules and enforcement procedures. Structural discrimination recognizes the interrelationship of race and space. 193 The structural characteristics of "geographical spaces" affect the resulting social and economic dynamics. 194 The economic dynamic depends on the ability of persons living in distinct spatial communities to become wealthproducing economic actors, which in turn makes those communities wealthbuilding. 195 Thus, unlike overt discrimination with its dependence on personal animus, structural discrimination's key factor is the economic oppression of actors who must overcome the nature and extent of this oppression to be economicaIIy productive. 196 By creating economic clusters, the well-regarded in- 192 Behavioral economists recognize as valid the idea of structural discrimination: that policies and practices that can only result in inequitable outcomes for minorities exist. As Dymski explains, "structural discrimination, insofar as it reflects the legacy of earlier market outcomes, can be the basis of a legal disparate-impact claim, only if overt historical discrimination can be identified in the markets in question." See Dymski, supra note 16, at 223. tention is to exploit, for short-term return, certain "races" and "spaces. "197 Policy changes regarding access to credit in minority communities must recognize the economic structural inequality that personal discrimination invariably creates. 198 Inter-market linkages exist. 199 Specifically, racial discrimination in the labor market has a spillover effect on outcomes in the credit market. 2oo Lenders who discriminate against minority borrowers who are as qualified as white borrowers, may be justifying decision-making on the "lower or more variable future earned-income levels.,,2ol
Discrimination in credit markets is statistically significant enough to have a negative effect on loan approvals and rates.2°2 There are important advances for remedying credit discrimination in studies that have provided core data about discrimination in credit markets. 203 The significance of these studies is that they examine two key components: (1) the actual loan performance of minority borrowers, and (2) "maximizing lenders,,204 Understanding how lenders project their lending outcomes can be highly informative of why discrimination still persists. The design of predictive analytics, the credit scoring models, and structured underwriting, for example, are more indicative of what outcomes are expected than why particular variables are chosen. Thus, it is possible to devel- op a fairly accurate sense of the statistical problems associated with models using illegal information. Fair lending reform will not be possible until the relationship between structural discrimination, technological advances such as credit scoring, and the objectives of maximizing lenders is fully understood. Left unaddressed, regulatory inconsistencies such as the ones discussed below will continue.
IV. INCREASING REGULATORY OVERSIGHT
Restoring the proper balance of competitive pressures in the mortgage origination market begins with reducing the informational asymmetries present in the mortgage lending market. Ultimately, the borrower benefits from increased transparency and an understanding of what factors the lender used in setting the interest rate.
A. Regulatory Purpose
Any legal analysis of discriminatory market behavior should take bounded rationality into account. 205 Incorporating behavioral economics norms into lending asks lenders to recognize the adverse effects of behavioral biases. 206 To have regulation which is behaviorally informed recognizes that individuals have gaps in information and understanding. Behaviorally informed regulation must also wrestle with the market's economic intuition. 207 Markets have developed so that they systematically exploit biases. In contrast to the neoclassical model, which relies on the interaction between rational choice and market competition, the complexity of bias in a competitive market setting often results in diminished consumer welfare. What is touted as market equilibrium may be bias exercised in competitive environments overlaid with borrower misperceptions and justified by business necessity.
Informed analyses using bounded rationality are, in many respects, an indirect foundation of discrimination law. Congress enacted fair lending laws based on the premise that bias and unfair actions are so imbedded in society that they cannot be overturned easily by individual decision-making. 208 A significant regulatory intervention is needed in the subprime market, given that the market forces have failed to fully discipline competition. The lack of competitive pressures provides the necessary incentive for greater expressions of bounded rationality to protect consumer welfare.
209
The current regulatory scheme does not adequately consider how borrower behavior ought to be considered in creating and maintaining credit scoring models. Under the current regulations, there is an ongoing duty for a lender to notice and modify a credit scoring system when there are "true shifts in behaviOr.,,210 Whenever there is a shift in actual borrower performance, lenders may make necessary adjustments such as adjusting cut-off scores, changing the underwriting policies, and purchasing or developing a new credit scoring model. 211 In doing so, lenders should exercise caution because doing so may result in a disparate impact. 212 These regulations while seemingly recognizing borrower behavior provide stronger protections to lenders than borrowers. Evaluating lenders credit scoring model and underwriting practices with regulatory changes can offer a stronger response to the market failures and discrimination that have arisen in the credit market.
B. The Lender's Duties When Establishing a Credit Scoring Model
The current disparate impact test in fair lending as implemented through regulations fails to provide lenders with a solid statistical test for measuring discrimination and vaguely defines business justification. Changing the legal rules to measure disparate impact in fair lending as a combination of treatment and performance information would uncover the complexities that facilitate biased determinations?13 This reformulated test adequately and fairly evaluates the predictive power of "statistically sound" credit scoring systems as Regulation B mandates. 214 tions to conceal policy choices that do not promote the public good through corporate governance regimes). Specifically, three aspects of the current test should be changed. First, the test should require lenders to identify the variables and assign weights that may be resulting in impermissible market segmentation. Second, it should require the use of blended data pooled from groups of lenders to identify and evaluate pricing irregularities. Finally, the new test should require a measure of actual performance as a determination of the lender's disparate impact in a given market.
I. Variable Inclusions
Structural discrimination may result in disparate impact discrimination when lenders choose, but do not reveal, selection factors that are correlated with minority group status. These factors are hidden in the lender's decision-making standards and can only be revealed by analysis intended to test for disparate impact. 2lS The disparate impact test as it is currently written and enforced is ineffective for several reasons. 216
The current enforcement regime cannot effectively test for latent bias because the regulators are unaware of the weights that lenders place on the control variables; therefore, the regulators do not account for variations in weights among different lenders. 217 Regulators use random samples of lender's files from which findings on discrimination are averaged. 218
To uncover disparate impact discrimination, a significantly different analytical model is more effective. Specifically, there should be a composite evaluation of all lenders' minority loan applications, or "pooled data. 223 Such studies have provided deeper insight when combined with HMDA data, credit report data, loan-to value ratio,224 census tract data,225 mortgage APRs,226 and with loan performance data using standard underwriting variables. 227 These types of data studies are more comprehensive, and thus needed in the fair lending regulatory sphere to identify and stop discriminatory efforts before they reach consumers. The current enforcement regime, which lacks these mechanisms, not only fails to deter unfair lending, but can easily result in an unfair enforcement system. 228 By assigning weights to certain variables, lenders can avoid the penalties associated with disparate treatment discrimination while still intentionally engaging in practices that result in disparate impact across racial lines?29 Under the current rules, if a lender intentionally identifies a variable more associated with the actions of a protected class and assigns a different weight to it, the result is a disparate impact, which cannot be identified through disparate impact testing. These indirect observations become the "race tax" that provide lenders with the motivation to direct a certain outcome, usually based on profitS. 230 This focus on weights is important for another reason: it can prove favorable for a plaintiff establishing a prima facie case of a disparate impact violation. 231 Again, under the current enforcement regime, a plaintiff must allege with particularity the lender's discriminatory policy or practice. 232 The reformulated test should eliminate the particularity requirement on plaintiffs bringing a disparate impact claim using statistical information. Furthermore, a plaintiff should not need to pinpoint what part of the system caused the disparate impact only that one exists. Thus, once a plaintiff presents statistical evidence of a lender's disparate impact, the burden should shift to the lender to provide a business necessity justification.
Another issue the use of variables raises is what role these variables play in the estimation equations for default and foreclosure loss. While lenders cannot use prohibited variables reflecting demographic characteristics in underwriting, those variables may be used in estimation equations. 233 Whether there is a correlation between and a need to use the prohibited variables is an issue of creditworthiness that might be justified by business need. One approach is to force prohibited variables into all equations, and evaluate the lender's creditworthiness variables based on the business need for estimates of default and foreclosure.
The Performance Analysis
The gap in the development of disparate impact becomes most obvious when comparing cases and literature relating to statistically based techniques for "validating" a test or other screening mechanism. 234 The appropriate selection practice is unclear. A comparison to the validation methods used in the employment setting is appropriate. To validate their selection devices, employers analyze "the measures of work behavior that are relevant to job performance.'>235 To validate a practice as job-related, an employer must create or define the actual measures of job performance, which in many instances could be extremely subjective. 236 A validated Title VII study evaluates both the subjective job criteria, as well as performance. The use of subjective criteria requires that the employer perform a validation study.237 Recognizing that the measurement of performance is complex, the employer must develop subjective "criteria" before the validation study on selection procedures. 238 The employer must also evaluate the presence of bias in the existing job criteria used to measure performance.2 39
Measuring actual performance is important in the fair lending context. Performance arguably is measured by a statistical analysis of whether the loan was paid as agreed.2 4o As argued above, measuring the validity of the performance device using the lender's identified performance criteria may be flawed. 241 The presumption is that credit scoring systems treat all applicants objectively.242 236 Id. 237 Id. 238 Id. 239 28 C.F.R. § 12b(2) (requiring that the employer consider the "possibility of bias" in developing its job performance analysis Critics of the system argue that scores are full of errors, easy to manipulate, and dangerous to use. In 2005, CreditSights, an independent credit research firm, said FICO scores have become an excuse to lead consumers into higher levels of indebtedness. Banks responded by displaying rising FICO scores as a panacea to calm concerns about future credit deteriora-The complexity of credit scoring systems raises the possibility of disparate impact in design.249 The design of the variables affects the accuracy of the predictors. 25o Whether the lender designs the system so that it reflects more than a preference for certain types of borrowers or imposes disadvantages on minority borrowers is the question. 251 Often, particular predictive variables correlate differently with repayment behavior for white males than for other classes of applicants. 252
Designing an equitable system requires recognizing how variables differ among populations. The comparison sample population must not only include similar group members, but also variables that are relevant to that group. Characteristics of minority borrowers that predict financial accountability may vary based on geography, financial practices, and economic cycles that are admittedly different in minority communities. the market into borrowers who will pay above-market interest rates because they are "disconnected from the market.,,256 Borrowers qualified as subprime may have insufficient credit history or they may have the type of credit accounts that are not favored in the scoring scheme?57 Due in part to the weights and values assigned to credit scores, the scores of those who do not conform to traditional notions of prudent credit behavior are depressed?58 With little room for variance under these traditional notions, the industry is beginning to acknowledge that the system is biased against historically excluded borrowers and has proposed alternative models. 259 Proponents of credit scoring argue that it has closed an information gap that has long been harmful to credit-impaired borrowers?60 They argue that the automated credit check eases the information asymmetry, which prevented markets from operating efficiently and created credit rationing. 261 That argument extends further to posit that the use of credit scoring ended credit rationing in the housing credit market, thus making that market as efficient and accessible as it has become?62
Credit reporting and scoring have admittedly enhanced the credit infrastruc-ture.2 63 The creation of the borrower risk protile will make information about borrowers broader, and thus the determination of whether borrower asymmetries have actually narrowed depends on what information is used to create the borrowers' risk-profile. 264 
C. Limiting the Business Justification Defense
The choice of credit scoring as a method of risk assessment includes an obligation to continuously monitor and make changes. To specifically require that lenders validate the predictive power of their chosen scoring model is consistent with the fair lending doctrine as it has now evolved.
Lenders have a responsibility to ensure that their credit scoring model accurately retlects the characteristics and demographics of the applicant pool. It is not uncommon for credit scoring models to be based on the performance of the lender's past borrowers. 265 However, those borrowers may have dissimilar risk profiles. It is also possible for the pool of borrowers to be incompatible with the lender's market demographics. 266 Lenders must track loan performance based on the established credit scoring model characteristics. 267 Failure to do so may result in risk limits continuing to operate that are unnecessarily restrictive and that produce an unjustifiable disparate impact. 268 The product and scoring models used in mortgage lending can also lead to inherently conflicting results. It is especially important that the credit scoring system used in mortgage lending be based on mortgage loans. It is not unreasonable to require that the credit scoring system used for mortgage lending be based on the particular mortgage product. The internal scoring system should account for the fact that most predictive systems limit consideration of default to the initial years of the mortgage loan and do not consider default throughout the course of the loan. The typical credit scoring system does not distinguish patterns of home ownership by race or class. This is a significant omission because minority and lower and moderate income households tend to buy, sell, and refinance less often than whites. In this regard, the home is less of a commodity and may be seen as worthy of sacrifice to avoid default or foreclosure. 269 The lender's duty must include creating an acceptable correlation between legitimate business needs and the criteria responsive to those needs. Specifically, this means validating the predictive scoring model prior to use. The lender's duty is to correlate the borrower's risk criteria with the business needs, e.g., the interest rates and fees, to make a profit. That duty to monitor and make changes when the statistical predictive power is found to have over-predicted the borrower's riskiness is ongoing. The profit generated from the scoring model should be based on validated creditworthiness variables. 270 As to pricing, there are some further basics that lenders must observe.271 The lender must be able to identify when the current pricing model was put in place. There should not be an opportunity for post hoc rationalizations when pricing differences occur. The lender's price model must undergo exacting, definitive review. Each part of the model, e.g., the price adjustments, should be independently validated. Risk factors should be singularly-counted. For each price adjustment, there must be a separate calculation showing either credit loss or lender costs. After validation and price differentials are confirmed and there is a significant price differential based on a particular variable, a correlation must be shown between the variable and the lender's costs.z n Exercising care in this context requires the lender to make loans that are sustainable with profits that are fair. An unconscionable or unfair profit would be one that is outside the established norm or profit range of the loan's peer group. A lender that earns an above-market rate profit will need to show that those loans were not unduly profitable at the borrowers' expense. This can be shown by evaluating the borrowers' residual income requirements and the loans' broker fees or yield spread premium. 273 By incorporating these require- Southwest Airlines, Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 302, n.25 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (holding that "if an employer could justify employment discrimination merely on the grounds that it is necessary to make a profit, Title VII would be nullified in short order"). 271 The Federal Reserve Board has not released uniform guidelines similar to the ones issued by the EEOC, although such guidelines would be helpful. 272 Alan White, Borrowing While Black, 60 S.C.L. LAW REV. 677, 701 (2009). 273 Residual income requirements measure the borrower's financial capacity for the loan by evaluating a borrower's ability to make payments on the proposed loan and to also pay other required living expenses, such as food, utilities, and transportation costs. The loan underwriters should demonstrate that, after accounting for the expected monthly payment, the proposed borrower still has a certain absolute amount of income left over to cover other ments into the lender's test for business necessity, the lender is forced to have a prospective examination for unconscionable profits.
V. CONCLUSION
"In order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of race.
There is no other way. ,,274
Lending discrimination, as with other inequities based on race, has become more subtle and complex. Fair lending has failed in many respects. The foreclosure crisis reveals the existence of substantial bias in mortgage lending and mandates a change in how we police this bias. Credit scoring has undoubtedly increased the availability and affordability of credit. As a screening device, credit scoring is cost-effective and efficient. Creditors are able to establish prices that are consistent with the risks and costs of extending credit to all types of borrowers. Yet, credit scoring inherently may lead to lending discrimination. Similarly, underwriting has also become an art of disguise.
The ever-present formal statements and prolific policies of lenders who claim to provide equal credit opportunity appear meaningless given the gap in credit and wealth accumulation that minority borrowers face. The structure of decision-making and implied bias in granting credit has replaced disparate treatment and continued lending inequity. The structural, relational, and situational biases that occur in lending are not adequately addressed by the rules that prohibit discrimination. While lenders justify the resulting exclusion under the legitimate business need doctrine and appear to be in compliance with legal rules and norms, the perverse effect is to sanction conduct that is an anathema to the statute's purpose and objectives. An expected response is to create more federal laws. However, the potential remedy of creating more federal laws bears the danger of being under or over-inclusive. Rules that are broad will also have the consequence of being ambiguous.
Rather than pursuing after-the-fact-enforcement, the legislature should implement an entirely different regulatory approach. While the judiciary's interpretations of disparate impact are critical to understanding the legal rules, the full capacity of the regulatory system is needed to corral all of the institutional players that contribute to this structural bias. The complex regulatory system of ensuring fair lending requires an approach that encourages the development of processes that will establish acceptable standards in particular contexts.
This proposal focuses on changes at the regulatory level. Moving away from a court-centered regulatory focus is not a denial of the judiciary's significance in creating and enforcing fair lending laws. However, focusing on the crux of the problem as calculated institutional compliance clears the way for a regulatory approach to emerge that will more adequately address anti-bias activities rather than simply resorting to market theories. As a standardized measure of credit risk, credit scoring also facilitates access to capital markets through the securitization of loans on the secondary market. Yet, the use of market imperfections related to information, discrimination, and household financial characteristics leads to questions about whether credit scoring is in fact objective and accurate. Both theoretical and empirical evidence indicate that credit scoring has adverse effects on protected classesYs If lenders use weighted variables, such as geography, occupation, and length of time at residence, as proxies for personal characteristics prohibited by law, credit scoring makes credit more expensive for certain market segments. A cycle of biased lending and high-cost credit ultimately leads to market failure, as is evidenced by the current subprime market meltdown.
Under the current regulatory scheme, credit scoring devices are not adequately tested to root out discriminatory impact based on either race or its proxies. The included variables, which banks treat as proprietary information disclosed only to regulators, make bias efficient and profitable, and legitimizes the bias. In turn, a transformed financial system requires that lenders demonstrate a different kind of proticiency in credit underwriting. The needed proficiency requires that transparency extend to borrowers as they become more aware of the variables used to determine their credit score and understand how the offered loan rate is calculated.
